The development of fault-tolerant distributed systems that can tolerate Byzantine behavior has traditionally been focused on consensus protocols, which support fully-replicated designs. For the development of more sophisticated high-performance Byzantine distributed systems, more specialized fault-tolerant communication primitives are necessary, however.
Introduction
Recently, the emergence of blockchain technology has fueled a renewed interest in the development of fault-tolerant distributed systems in which some of the participating replicas behave malicious [2, 6, 9, 12, 14, 16, 19-21, 23, 24, 32, 33, 36, 37, 42] . The main focus of current developments is mostly limited to fully-replicated systems in which each participating replica has the same role. The benefit of such a fully-replicated design is that one can rely on readily-available consensus protocols to implement such a design [10, 28, 39] .
We envision the design and development of more sophisticated high-performance Byzantine systems in which replicas have specialized roles. An example of such a system would be a sharded geo-scale design in which data is kept in local Byzantine clusters. In such a sharded geo-scale design, many queries can efficiently be answered by involving only a single cluster. In this way, a sharded design will often improve scalability and performance when dealing with massive large-scale databases [34, 40] . For answering more complex queries, we need cooperation between different clusters, however.
Hence, to enable the design and development of such systems, we need reliable ways for Byzantine clusters to communicate and cooperate. We believe that the existing consensus protocols are insufficient to fulfill this aim [1, 3-5, 10, 11, 13, 17, 25-27, 30, 39, 41] : we can run a single global consensus protocol among all replicas in all clusters to enable sharing of data and queries, but this would be at high-quadratic-communication costs for all replicas involved and would eliminate any possible scaling benefits of a clustered design. Indeed, we believe that there is a pressing need for more specialized Byzantine communication primitives. In this paper
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PBS-bcs Omit n C 1 > 3f C 1 , n C 2 > 3f C 2 O(max(n C 1 , n C 2 )) (optimal) O( v ) PBS-brs Byzantine, RS n C 1 > 4f C 1 , n C 2 > 4f C 2 O(max(n C 1 , n C 2 )) (optimal) O( v ) PBS-bcs Byzantine, RS n C 1 > 3f C 1 , n C 2 > 3f C 2 O(max(n C 1 , n C 2 )) O( v + f C 1 ) PBS-bcs Byzantine, CS n C 1 > 3f C 1 , n C 2 > 3f C 2 O(max(n C 1 , n C 2 )) (optimal) O( v ) Figure 1 : Overview of cluster-sending protocols that sends a value v from cluster C 1 to cluster C 2 . In the above, RS is shorthand for replica signing, CS is a shorthand for cluster signing, and PBS is a shorthand for the relevant instances of BS, SPBS, and RPBS, which are protocols that use (partitioned) bijective sending.
we formalize one such primitive, the cluster-sending problem: the problem of sending a message from one Byzantine cluster to another Byzantine cluster in a reliable manner that is verifiable by all replicas involved. Our main contributions are as follows:
(1) We formalize the cluster-sending problem.
(2) We prove strict lower bounds on the complexity of the cluster-sending problem in terms of the number of messages (when faulty replicas only crash) and the number of signatures (when faulty replicas can be malicious and messages are signed). In both cases, these lower bounds are only linear in the size of the clusters involved.
(3) We introduce bijective sending, a powerful technique to reliably send messages between clusters of roughly the same size. To generalize bijective sending to arbitrary-sized clusters, we introduce partitioned bijective sending techniques.
(4) For many practical environments, we develop optimal cluster-sending protocols that use (partitioned) bijective sending and whose complexity matches the lower bounds established.
A full overview of all the environmental conditions we study and corresponding protocols we propose can be found in Figure 1 .
Organization In Section 2, we introduce the terminology used throughout this paper and formally define the cluster-sending problem. In Section 3, we show how to use reliable broadcasting as straightforward basic technique to solve the cluster-sending problem in all possible settings. Next, in Section 4, we prove lower bounds on the complexity of the cluster-sending problem. Then, in Section 5, we introduce bijective sending, a powerful cluster-sending technique that performs cluster-sending with minimal communication between clusters of comparable sizes in which a minority of all replicas are faulty. Next, in Section 6, we introduce partition techniques that allow for the generalization of bijective sending to clusters of arbitrary sizes. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude on our findings and discuss avenues for future work.
Formalizing the cluster-sending problem
A cluster C is a set of replicas. We write f(C) ⊆ C to denote the set of faulty replicas in C and nf(C) = C \ f(C) to denote the set of non-faulty replicas in C. We write n C = |C|, f C = |f(C)|, and nf C = |nf(C)| to denote the number of replicas, faulty replicas, and non-faulty replicas in the cluster, respectively. We extend the notations f(·), nf(·), n (·) , f (·) , and nf (·) to arbitrary sets of replicas. In this work, we consider faulty replicas that can crash, omit messages, or behave Byzantine. A crashing replica executes steps correctly up till some point, after which it does not execute anything. An omitting replica executes steps correctly, but can decide to not send a message when it should or decide to ignore messages it receives. A Byzantine replica can behave in arbitrary, possibly coordinated and malicious, manners. A cluster system S is a finite set of clusters such that communication between replicas in a cluster is local and communication between clusters is non-local. We assume that there is no practical bound on local communication (e.g., within a single data center rack), while global communication is limited, costly, and to be avoided (e.g., between data centers in different continents). If C 1 , C 2 ∈ S are distinct clusters, then we assume that C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅: no replica is part of two distinct clusters.
Definition 2.1. Let S be a system and C 1 , C 2 ∈ S be two clusters with non-faulty replicas (nf(C 1 ) = ∅ and nf(C 2 ) = ∅). The cluster-sending problem is the problem of sending a value v from C 1 to C 2 such that:
1. all non-faulty replicas in C 2 receive the value v;
2. only if all non-faulty replicas in C 1 agree upon sending the value v to C 2 will non-faulty replicas in C 2 receive v; and 3. all non-faulty replicas in C 1 can confirm that the value v was received.
In the following, we assume asynchronous reliable communication: all messages send by non-faulty replicas eventually arrive at their destination. None of the protocols we propose rely on message delivery timings for their correctness. Let C ∈ S be a cluster and r ∈ C be a replica. We assume that, on receipt of a message m from replica r, one can determine that r did sent m if r ∈ nf(C); and one can only determine that m was sent by a non-faulty replica if r ∈ nf(C). Hence, faulty replicas are able to impersonate each other, but are not able to impersonate non-faulty replicas. We study the cluster-sending problem for Byzantine systems in two different types of environments:
1. A system provides replica signing if every replica r can sign arbitrary messages m, resulting in a certificate m r . These certificates are non-forgeable and can be constructed only if r cooperates in constructing them. Based on only the certificate m r , anyone can verify that m was originally supported by r (unless r ∈ f(C)).
2.
A system provides cluster signing if it is equipped with a signature scheme that can be used to cluster-sign arbitrary messages m, resulting in a certificate m C . These certificates are non-forgeable and can be constructed only if all non-faulty replicas in nf(C) cooperate in constructing them. Based on only the certificate m C , anyone can verify that m was originally supported by all non-faulty replicas in C.
In practice, replica signing can be implemented using digital signatures, which rely on a public-key cryptography infrastructure [31] , and cluster signing can be implemented using threshold signatures, which are available for some public-key cryptography infrastructures [38] . Let m be a message, C ∈ S a cluster, and r ∈ C a replica. We write v to denote the size of any arbitrary value v. We assume that the size of certificates m r , obtained via replica signing, and certificates m C , obtained via cluster signing, are both linearly upper-bounded by m . More specifically, (m, m r ) = O( m ) and (m, m C ) = O( m ).
We notice that cluster signing can be emulated using replica signing. If C ∈ S is a cluster, m is a message, and non-faulty replicas in nf(C) only provide certificates m r if there is consensus on doing so among all non-faulty replicas in nf(C), then the set { m r | r ∈ S}, for any set S ⊆ C with |S| = f C + 1, can be used in the same manner as a cluster certificate m C . In this case, we have (m, m C ) = O( m + f C ), however. If we assume only crash or omission failures, then Protocol for the sending cluster C 1 : 1: Agree on v and distribute (v, v C1 ) to all non-faulty replicas in C 1 . 2: Choose replicas S 1 ⊆ C 1 with n S1 = f C1 + 1. 3: Choose replicas S 2 ⊆ C 2 with n S2 = f C2 + 1.
for r 2 ∈ S 2 do 6:
Protocol for the receiving cluster C 2 : 7: event r 2 ∈ nf(C 2 ) receives (w, w C1 ) from a replica in C 1 do
8:
Broadcast (w, w C1 ) to all replicas in C 2 . 9: event r 2 ∈ nf(C 2 ) receives (w, w C1 ) from a replica in C 2 do 10: r 2 considers w received. Figure 2 : RB-bcs, the reliable broadcast clustersending protocol that sends a value v from C 1 to C 2 . We assume Byzantine failures and a system that provides cluster signing. no replica will ever try to forge messages of other replicas or send messages outside the scope of the relevant protocol. Hence, in this setting, replica signing or cluster signing does not add any reliability, implying there is no need for certificates. In this case, we simply emulate replica or cluster certificates by not including them.
When necessary, we assume that replicas in each cluster C ∈ S can reach agreement on a value using an off-the-shelf consensus protocol [1, 3-5, 10, 11, 13, 17, 25-27, 30, 39, 41] . In the best case, when we only have crash failures or when we have synchronous communication and replica signing (within a cluster), these protocols require n C > 2f C , which we assume to be the case for all sending clusters. 1 In this paper, we use the notation i sgn j, with i, j ≥ 0 and sgn the sign function, to denote i if j > 0 and 0 otherwise.
Cluster-sending via reliable broadcasts
A principle technique used by consensus protocols to guarantee agreement of non-faulty replicas is message broadcasting (e.g., as used in Paxos and Pbft [10, 11, 28, 29] ). We can use message broadcasting in the construction of simple cluster-sending protocols, which can be used as a baseline for comparisons.
First, we present a broadcast-based protocol that can operate in a system with Byzantine failures and cluster certificates. In this protocol, cluster C 1 uses a consensus protocol to reach agreement on a value v. Then, a set S 1 ⊆ C 1 of f C 1 + 1 replicas in C 1 and a set S 2 ⊆ C 2 of f C 2 + 1 replicas in C 2 are chosen. Finally, each replica in S 1 is instructed to broadcast v to all replicas in S 2 . Due to the size of S 1 and S 2 , at least one non-faulty replica in C 1 will send a value to a non-faulty replica in C 2 , which is sufficient to bootstrap receipt and confirmation of v in C 2 . The pseudo-code for this protocol, named RB-bcs, can be found in Figure 2 . Next, we prove the correctness of RB-bcs: Proposition 3.1. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and cluster signing and let
Proof. Choose S 1 ⊆ C 1 and S 2 ⊆ C 2 in accordance with RB-bcs. We have n S 1 = f C 1 + 1 and n S 2 = f C 2 + 1. By construction, we have nf S 1 ≥ 1 and nf S 2 ≥ 1. Due to Line 6, each replica r 2 ∈ nf(S 2 ) will receive the message (v, v C 1 ) from every replica in nf(S 1 ). As nf S 1 ≥ 1, every 1 Strictly speaking there exist synchronous authenticated consensus protocols that can reach agreement on a value among all non-faulty replicas even if nC ≤ 2fC, e.g. [15, 35] . Unfortunately, an outside observer-including other clusters-will never be able to reliable learn this value, as it will never be able to distinguish between the faulty and the non-faulty replicas.
Protocol for the sending cluster C 1 : 1: Agree on v and distribute v to all non-faulty replicas in C 1 . 2: Choose replicas S 1 ⊆ C 1 with n S1 = 2f C1 + 1. 3: Choose replicas S 2 ⊆ C 2 with n S2 = f C2 + 1.
Protocol for the receiving cluster C 2 : 7: event r 2 ∈ nf(C 2 ) receives (w, w r 1 ) from a replica r 1 ∈ C 1 do 8:
Broadcast (w, w r 1 ) to all replicas in C 2 . 9: event r 2 ∈ nf(C 2 ) receives f C1 + 1 messages (w, w r 1 ) such that:
(a) each message is sent by a replica in C 2 ; and (b) each message includes a w r 1 from distinct replicas r 1 ∈ C 1 do 10: r 2 considers w received. Figure 3 : RB-brs, the reliable broadcast clustersending protocol that sends a value v from C 1 to C 2 . We assume Byzantine failures and a system that provides replica signing. r 2 ∈ nf(S 2 ) will meet the condition at Line 7 and broadcast (v, v C 1 ) to all replicas in C 2 . As nf S 2 ≥ 1, each replica r 2 ∈ nf(C 2 ) will meet the condition at Line 9, proving receipt and confirmation. We have agreement, as v C 1 is non-forgeable.
As replica signing can emulate cluster signing, RB-bcs can also be used for systems with only replica signing. Such an emulated solution does require large messages whose size depends on the size of the sending cluster, however. For systems with replica signing we can improve on RB-bsv in another manner. We propose RB-brs, for which the pseudo-code can be found in Figure 3 . Next, we prove the correctness of RB-brs: Proposition 3.2. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and replica signing and let C 1 , C 2 ∈ S. If n C 1 > 2f C 1 and n C 2 > f C 2 , then RB-brs satisfies Definition 2.1. The protocol sends
Proof. Choose S 1 ⊆ C 1 and S 2 ⊆ C 2 in accordance with RB-brs. We have n S 1 = 2f C 1 + 1 and n S 2 = f C 2 + 1. By construction, we have nf S 1 ≥ f(C 1 ) + 1 and nf S 2 ≥ 1. Due to Line 6, each replica r 2 ∈ nf(S 2 ) will receive messages (v, v r 1 ) from every replica in r 1 ∈ nf(T 1 ). Hence, r 2 will meet the condition at Line 7 for each such message (v, v r 1 ) and broadcast these messages to all replicas in C 2 . As nf S 2 ≥ 1 and nf S 1 ≥ f C 1 + 1, each replica r 2 ∈ nf(C 2 ) will meet the condition at Line 9, proving receipt and confirmation.
To prove agreement, we show that only values agreed upon by C 1 will be considered received by non-faulty replicas in nf(C 2 ). Consider a value v not agreed upon by C 1 . Hence, only the replicas in f(C 1 ) will sign v . Due to non-forgeability of replica certificates, the only certificates constructed for v are of the form v r 1 , r 1 ∈ f(C 1 ). Consequently, each replica in C 2 can only receive and broadcast up to f C 1 distinct messages of the form (v , v r 1 ), r 1 ∈ C 1 . We conclude that no non-faulty replica will meet the conditions for v at Line 9.
Lower bounds for the cluster-sending problem
In the previous sections, we formalized the cluster-sending problem and considered broadcastingbased protocols to solve this problem. Unfortunately, these broadcasting-based protocols have high communication costs that, in the worst case, are quadratic in the size of the clusters involved. To determine whether we can do better than broadcasting, we will study the lower bound on communication costs for any protocol solving the cluster-sending problem.
First, we consider systems with only crash failures, in which case we can lower bound the number of messages exchanged. This lower bound is entirely determined by the maximum number of messages that can get lost due to faulty replicas not sending messages or ignoring received messages. In situations in which some replicas need to send or receive multiple messages, the capabilities of faulty replicas to ignore messages is likewise multiplied. E.g., when the number of senders outnumbers the receivers, then some receivers must receive multiple messages. As these receivers could be faulty, this means they could cause loss of multiple messages. By a thorough analysis, we end up with the following lower bounds: Theorem 4.1. Let S be a system with crash failures, let C 1 , C 2 ∈ S, and let {i, j} = {1, 2} such that n C i ≥ n C j . Let q i = (f C i + 1) div nf C j , let r i = (f C i + 1) mod nf C j , and let σ i = q i n C j + r i + f C j sgn r i . Any protocol that solves the cluster-sending problem in which C 1 sends a value v to C 2 needs to exchange at least σ i messages.
Proof. We assume i = 1, j = 2, and n C 1 ≥ n C 2 . The proof is by contradiction. Hence, assume that a protocol P can solve the cluster-sending problem using at most σ 1 − 1 messages. Consider a run of P that sends messages M . Without loss of generality, we can assume that |M | = σ 1 − 1. Let R be the top f C 2 receivers of messages in M , let S = C 2 \ R, let M R ⊂ M be the messages received by replicas in R, and let N = M \ M R . We notice that n R = f C 2 and that n S = nf C 2 .
First, we prove that
there must be a replica in R that received at most q 1 − 1 messages. As |N | ≥ q 1 nf C 2 , there must be a replica in S that received at least q 1 messages. The other case is r 1 > 0. In this case,
there must be a replica in R that received at most q 1 messages. As |N | > q 1 nf C 2 , there must be a replica in S that received at least q 1 + 1 messages. In both cases, we identified a replica in S that received more messages than a replica in R, a contradiction. Hence, we must conclude that |M R | ≥ q 1 f C 2 + f C 2 sgn r 1 and, consequently, |N | ≤ q 1 nf C 2 + r 1 − 1 ≤ f C 1 . As n R = f C 2 , all replicas in R could have crashed, in which case only the messages in N are actually received. As |N | ≤ f C 1 , all messages in N could be sent by replicas that have crashed. Hence, in the worst case, no message in M is successfully sent by a non-faulty replica in C 1 and received by a non-faulty replica in C 2 , implying that P fails.
Notice that the above lower bounds guarantee the delivery of at least one message. Next, we look at systems with Byzantine failures and replica signing. In this environment, we prove a lower bound on the number of certificates exchanged. In this case, the receiving cluster C 2 must eventually receive f C 1 + 1 distinct certificates signed by distinct replicas in C 1 . A thorough analysis reveals the following lower bounds: Theorem 4.2. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and replica signing and let C 1 , C 2 ∈ S. Consider the cluster-sending problem in which C 1 sends a value v to C 2 .
1. Let q 1 = (2f
, then any protocol that solves the cluster-sending problem needs to exchange at least τ 1 certificates of the form v r , r ∈ C 1 .
, and τ 2 = q 2 n C 1 + r 2 + 2f C 1 sgn r 2 . If n C 2 ≥ n C 1 , then any protocol that solves the cluster-sending problem needs to exchange at least τ 2 certificates of the form v r , r ∈ C 1 .
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that each certificate is send to C 2 in an individual message independent of the other certificates. Hence, each certificate has a sender and a signer (both replicas in C 1 ) and a receiver (a replica in C 2 ). First, we prove the case for n C 1 ≥ n C 2 using contradiction. Assume that a protocol P can solve the cluster-sending problem using at most τ 1 − 1 certificates. Consider a run of P that Protocol for the sending cluster C 1 : 1: Agree on v and distribute (v, v C1 ) to all non-faulty replicas in C 1 . 2: Choose replicas S 1 ⊆ C 1 with n S1 = f C1 + f C2 + 1. 3: Choose replicas S 2 ⊆ C 2 with n S2 = f C1 + f C2 + 1. 4: Choose a bijection b : S 1 → S 2 . 5: for r 1 ∈ S 1 do 6:
Protocol for the receiving cluster C 2 : 7: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in RB-bcs. Figure 4 : BS-bcs, the bijective sending cluster-sending protocol that sends a value v from C 1 to C 2 . We assume Byzantine failures and a system that provides cluster signing.
sends messages C, each message representing a single certificate, with |C| = τ 1 − 1. Following the proof of Theorem 4.1, one can show that, in the worst case, at most f C 1 messages are sent by non-faulty replicas in C 1 and received by non-faulty replicas in C 2 . Now consider the situation in which the faulty replicas in C 1 mimic the behavior in C by sending certificates for another value v to the same receivers. For the replicas in C 2 , the two runs behave the same, as in both cases at most f C 1 certificates for a value, possibly signed by distinct replicas, are received. Hence, either both runs successfully send values, in which case v is received by C 2 without agreement, or both runs fail to send values. In both cases, P fails to solve the cluster-sending problem.
Next, we prove the case for n C 2 ≥ n C 1 using contradiction. Assume that a protocol P can solve the cluster-sending problem using at most τ 2 − 1 certificates. Consider a run of P that sends messages C, each message representing a single certificate, with |C| = τ 2 − 1. Let R be the top 2f C 1 signers of certificates in C, let C R ⊂ C be the certificates signed by replicas in R, and let D = C \ C R . Via a contradiction argument similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 4.1, one can show that |C R | ≥ 2q 2 f C 1 + 2f C 1 sgn r and |D| ≤ q 2 (nf
all replicas receiving these certificates could have crashed. Hence, the only certificates that are received by C 2 are in C R . Partition C R into two sets of certificates C R,1 and C R,2 such that both sets contain certificates signed by at most f C 1 distinct replicas. As the certificates in C R,1 and C R,2 are signed by f C 1 distinct replicas, one of these sets can contain only certificates signed by Byzantine replicas. Hence, either C R,1 or C R,2 could certify a non-agreed upon value v , while only the other set certifies v. Consequently, the replicas in C 2 cannot distinguish between receiving an agreed-upon value v or a non-agreed-upon-value v . We conclude that P fails to solve the cluster-sending problem.
Cluster-sending via bijective sending
In the previous section, we explored lower bounds for the cluster-sending problem. Close inspection shows that these lower bounds are only linear in the size of the clusters involved, which is much better than the quadratic bounds of straightforward broadcasting-based protocols. Hence, there is much room for improvement. Next, we develop bijective sending, a powerful technique that allows the design of highly efficient cluster-sending protocols. In bijective sending, cluster C 1 uses the consensus protocol to reach agreement on a value v and certificate v C 1 . Then, the protocol chooses sets S 1 ⊆ C 1 and S 2 ⊆ C 2 of equal size and instruct each replica in S 1 ⊆ C 1 to send (v, v C 1 ) to a distinct replica in C 2 . By choosing S 1 sufficiently large, we can guarantee successful cluster-sending. First, we present a bijective-sending protocol for systems with Byzantine failures and cluster signing. The pseudo-code for this protocol, named BS-bcs, can be found in Figure 4 . Next, we illustrate bijective sending, the underlying technique utilized by BS-bcs:
Example 5.1. Let S be a system, let C 1 = {r 1 , . . . , r 8 } ∈ S with f(C 1 ) = {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 }, and let r1  r2  r3  r4  r5  r6  r7  r8   r9  r10  r11  r12  r13 r14 r15
Figure 5: Bijection sending from C 1 to C 2 . The faulty replicas are highlighted using a red background. The edges connect replicas r ∈ C 1 with b(r) ∈ C 2 . Each solid edge indicates a message sent and received by non-faulty replicas. Each dashed edge indicates a message sent or received by a faulty replica.
Protocol for the sending cluster C 1 : 1: Agree on v and distribute v to all non-faulty replicas in C 1 . 2: Choose replicas S 1 ⊆ C 1 with n S1 = 2f C1 + f C2 + 1. Protocol for the receiving cluster C 2 : 7: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in RB-brs. Figure 6 : BS-brs, the bijective sending cluster-sending protocol that sends a value v from C 1 to C 2 . We assume Byzantine failures and a system that provides replica signing.
C 2 = {r 9 , . . . , r 15 } ∈ S with f(C 2 ) = {r 9 , r 11 }. We have f C 1 + f C 2 + 1 = 6. We choose
In Figure 5 , we sketched this situation. Replica r 2 sends a valid message to r 9 . As r 9 is faulty, it might ignore this message. Replicas r 3 and r 4 are faulty and might not send a valid message. Additionally, r 11 is faulty and might ignore any message it receives. The messages sent from r 5 to r 12 , from r 6 to r 13 , and from r 7 to r 14 are all sent by non-faulty replicas to non-faulty replicas. Hence, these messages all arrive correctly.
Having illustrated the concept of bijective sending, as employed by BS-bcs, we are now ready to prove correctness of BS-bcs: Proposition 5.2. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and cluster signing and let
Proof. Choose S 1 ⊆ C 1 and S 2 ⊆ C 2 in accordance with BS-bcs. We have n S 1 = n S 2 = f C 1 +f C 2 +1. Let T = {b(r) | r ∈ nf(S 1 )}. By construction, we have nf S 1 = n T ≥ f C 2 + 1. Hence, we have nf T ≥ 1. Due to Line 6, each replica in nf(T ) will receive the message (v, v C 1 ) from a distinct replica in nf(S 1 ) and broadcast (v, v C 1 ) to all replicas in C 2 . As nf T ≥ 1, each replica r 2 ∈ nf(C 2 ) will receive (v, v C 1 ) from a replica in C 2 . Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
As replica signing can emulate cluster signing, BS-bcs can also be used for systems with only replica signing. Such an emulated solution does require large messages whose size depends on the size of the sending cluster, however. For systems with replica signing we can utilize bijective sending in another manner, however. We propose BS-brs, for which the pseudo-code can be found in Figure 6 . Next, we prove the correctness of BS-brs: Proposition 5.3. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and replica signing and let C 1 , C 2 ∈ S. If n C 1 > 2f C 1 + f C 2 and n C 2 > 2f C 1 + f C 2 , then BS-brs satisfies Definition 2.1. The protocol sends 2f
Proof. Choose S 1 ⊆ C 1 and S 2 ⊆ C 2 in accordance with BS-brs. We have n S 1 = n S 2 = 2f C 1 + f C 2 + 1. Let T = {b(r) | r ∈ nf(S 1 )}. By construction, we have nf
Cluster C:
Figure 7: An example of a 4-partition of a cluster C with 11 replicas, of which the first five are faulty. The three partitions are grouped in blue boxes, the faulty replicas are highlighted using a red background.
Hence, we have nf T ≥ f C 1 + 1. Due to Line 6, each replica in nf(T ) will receive the message (v, v r 1 ) from a distinct replica r 1 ∈ nf(S 1 ). Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
For completeness, we consider the situation in which replica certificates have constant size. In this case, the presented version of BS-brs performs too much communication. We can correct this by only letting f C 1 + f C 2 + 1 replicas send the value v, while all 2f C 1 + f C 2 + 1 replicas send a replica certificate.
Cluster-sending via partitioning
The bijective sending techniques introduced in the previous section have optimal communication complexity. Unfortunately, bijective sending is in practice limited to communication between similar-sized clusters, as it places unrealistic requirements on clusters that vastly differ in size.
Example 6.1. Consider a system S with Byzantine failures and cluster certificates. The cluster C 1 ∈ S wants to send value v to C 2 ∈ S. Notice that BS-bcs requires f C 1 + f C 2 ≤ n C 2 . Hence, when using BS-bcs, the number of faulty replicas in C 1 is upper-bounded by nf C 2 ≤ n C 2 , this independent of the size of C 1 .
Next, we show how to generalize bijective sending to arbitrary-sized clusters. We do so by partitioning the larger-sized cluster into a set of smaller clusters, and then letting sufficient of these smaller clusters participate independent in bijective sending. First, we introduce the relevant partitioning notation. Definition 6.2. Let S be a system with C ∈ S, let P be a subset of the replicas in S, let c > 0 be a constant, let q = n C div c, and let r = n C mod c. A c-partition partition(P) = {P 1 , . . . , P q , P } of P is a partition of the set of replicas P into sets P 1 , . . . , P q , P such that n P i = c, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, and n P = r. Example 6.3. Let S be a system, let C = {r 1 , . . . , r 11 } ∈ S, and let f(C) = {r 1 , . . . , r 5 }. The set partition(C) = {P 1 , P 2 , P } with P 1 = {r 1 , . . . , r 4 }, P 2 = {r 5 , . . . , r 8 }, and P = {r 9 , r 10 , r 11 } is a 4-partition of C. The cluster C and the partition partition(C) are illustrated in Figure 7 . We have f(P 1 ) = P 1 , nf(P 1 ) = ∅, and n P 1 = f P 1 = 4. Likewise, we have f(P 2 ) = {r 5 }, nf(P 2 ) = {r 6 , r 7 , r 8 }, n P 2 = 4, and f P 2 = 1.
Having introduced partitioning, we are ready to generalize bijective sending to non-similarsized clusters. Let C 1 be the sending cluster and C 2 be the receiving cluster. First, we consider the case n C 2 ≤ f C 1 + f C 2 . The pseudo-code for the protocol, named SPBS-(α,ζ), can be found in Figure 8 . Next, we prove the correctness of specific instances of the protocol for Byzantine systems that provide either cluster signing or replica signing: Proposition 6.4. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and let C 1 , C 2 ∈ S, σ 1 as defined in Theorem 4.1, and τ 1 as defined in Theorem 4.2.
1. If S provides cluster signing and σ 1 ≤ n C 1 , then SPBS-(σ 1 ,bcs) satisfies Definition 2.1. The protocol sends σ 1 messages, of size O( v ) each, between C 1 and C 2 .
Protocol for the sending cluster C 1 : 1: The agreement step of BS-ζ for value v. 2: Choose replicas P ⊆ C 1 with n P = α. 3: Choose a n C2 -partition partition(P) of P. 4: for P ∈ partition(P) do
5:
Choose replicas Q ⊆ C 2 with n Q = n P .
6:
Choose a bijection b : P → Q.
7:
for r 1 ∈ P do 8:
Send v from r 1 to b(r 1 ) via the send step of BS-ζ.
Protocol for the receiving cluster C 2 : 9: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in BS-ζ. SPBS-(α,ζ), ζ ∈ {bcs, brs}, the senderpartitioned bijective sending cluster-sending protocol that sends a value v from C 1 to C 2 . We assume the same system properties as BS-ζ.
Protocol for the sending cluster C 1 : 1: The agreement step of BS-ζ for value v. 2: Choose replicas P ⊆ C 2 with n P = α. 3: Choose a n C1 -partition partition(P) of P. 4: for P ∈ partition(P) do
5:
Choose replicas Q ⊆ C 1 with n Q = n P .
6:
Choose a bijection b : Q → P .
7:
for r 1 ∈ Q do 8:
Protocol for the receiving cluster C 2 : 9: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in BS-ζ. Figure 9 : RPBS-(α,ζ), ζ ∈ {bcs, brs}, the receiverpartitioned bijective sending cluster-sending protocol that sends a value v from C 1 to C 2 . We assume the same system properties as BS-ζ.
2. If S provides replica signing and τ 1 ≤ n C 1 , then SPBS-(τ 1 ,brs) satisfies Definition 2.1.
The protocol sends τ 1 messages, of size O( v ) each, between C 1 and C 2 .
Proof. Let β = (f C 1 + 1) in the case of cluster signing and let β = (2f C 1 + 1) in the case of replica signing. Let q = β div nf C 2 and r = β mod nf C 2 . We have α = qn C 2 + r + f C 2 sgn r. Choose P and choose partition(P) = {P 1 , . . . , P q , P } in accordance with SPBS-(α,ζ). For each P ∈ P, choose a Q and b in accordance with SPBS-(α,ζ), and let z(P ) = {r ∈ P | b(r) ∈ f(Q)}. As each such b has a distinct domain, the union of them is a surjection f : P → n C 2 . By construction, we have n P = r + f C 2 sgn r, n z(P ) ≤ f C 2 sgn r, and, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, n P i = n C 2 and n z(P i ) = f C 2 . Let V = P \ P ∈partition(P) z(P ) . We have
Let T = {f (r) | r ∈ nf(V )}. By construction, we have nf T = n T . To complete the proof, we consider cluster signing and replica signing separately. First, the case for cluster signing. As n V ≥ β = f C 1 + 1, we have nf V ≥ 1. By construction, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the messages (v, v C 1 ) from the replicas r 1 ∈ V . Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement. Finally, the case for replica signing. As n V ≥ β = 2f C 1 + 1, we have nf V ≥ f C 1 + 1. By construction, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the messages (v, v r 1 ) from each replica r 1 ∈ V . Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
Next, we consider the case n C 1 ≤ f C 1 + f C 2 . The pseudo-code for the protocol, named RPBS-(α,ζ), can be found in Figure 9 . Next, we prove the correctness of specific instances of the protocol for Byzantine systems that provide either cluster signing or replica signing: Proposition 6.5. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and let C 1 , C 2 ∈ S, σ 2 as defined in Theorem 4.1, and τ 2 as defined in Theorem 4.2.
1. If S provides cluster signing and σ 2 ≤ n C 2 , then RPBS-(σ 2 ,bcs) satisfies Definition 2.1.
The protocol sends σ 2 messages, of size O( v ) each, between C 1 and C 2 . 2. If S provides replica signing and τ 2 ≤ n C 2 , then RPBS-(τ 2 ,brs) satisfies Definition 2.1.
The protocol sends τ 2 messages, of size O( v ) each, between C 1 and C 2 .
Proof. Let β = nf C 1 and γ = 1 in the case of cluster signing and let β = (nf C 1 − f C 1 ) and γ = 2 in the case of replica signing. Let q = (f C 2 + 1) div β and r = (f C 2 + 1) mod β. We have α = qn C 1 + r + γf C 1 sgn r. Choose P and choose partition(P) = {P 1 , . . . , P q , P } in accordance with RPBS-(α,ζ). For each P ∈ P, choose a Q and b in accordance with RPBS-(α,ζ), and let z(P ) = {r ∈ P | b −1 (r) ∈ f(Q)}. As each such b −1 has a distinct domain, the union of them is a surjection f −1 : P → n C 1 . By construction, we have n P = r + γf C 1 sgn r, n z(P ) ≤ f C 1 sgn r, and, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, n P i = n C 1 and n z(P i ) = f C 1 . Let T = P \ P ∈partition(P) z(P ) . We have
To complete the proof, we consider cluster signing and replica signing separately. First, the case for cluster signing. We have β = nf C 1 and γ = 1. Hence,
We have nf T ≥ n T − f C 2 ≥ 1. Let V = {f −1 (r) | r ∈ nf(T )}. By construction, we have nf V = n V and we have nf V ≥ 1. Consequently, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the messages (v, v C 1 ) from the replicas r 1 ∈ V . Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement. Finally, the case for replica signing. We have β = nf C 1 − f C 1 and γ = 2. Hence,
We have nf T ≥ qf C 1 + f C 1 sgn r + 1 = (q + sgn r)f C 1 + 1. As there are (q + sgn r) non-empty sets in partition(P), there must be a set P ∈ P with n P ∩nf T ≥ f C 1 + 1. Let b be the bijection chosen earlier for P and let V = {b −1 (r) | r ∈ (P ∩ nf T )}. By construction, we have nf V = n V and we have nf V ≥ f C 1 + 1. Consequently, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the messages (v, v r 1 ) from each replica r 1 ∈ V . Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
As with BS-brs, SPBS-(τ 1 ,brs) and RPBS-(τ 2 ,brs) can be optimized for the case in which replica certificates have constant size. In these cases, we only let σ 1 or σ 2 replicas send the value v, respectively, while all τ 1 and τ 2 replicas send a replica certificate, respectively.
The bijective sending cluster-sending protocols, the sender-partitioned bijective clustersending protocols, and the receiver-partitioned bijective cluster-sending protocols each deal with differently-sized clusters. Furthermore, we can use the protocols designed with cluster certificates in mind also in the other cases using the cluster certificate emulation strategies discussed in Section 2. By choosing the applicable protocols, we have the following: Theorem 6.6. Let S be a system and let C 1 , C 2 ∈ S. Consider the cluster-sending problem in which C 1 sends a value v to C 2 .
1. If n C > 3f C , C ∈ S, and S has crash failures, omit failures, or Byzantine failures and cluster signing, then BS-bcs, SPBS-(σ 1 ,bcs), and RPBS-(σ 2 ,bcs) are a solution to the cluster-sending problem with optimal message complexity. These protocols solve the clustersending problem using O(max(n C 1 , n C 2 )) messages, of size O( v ) each. 2. If n C > 4f C , C ∈ S, and S has Byzantine failures and replica sending, then BS-brs, SPBS-(τ 1 ,brs), and RPBS-(τ 2 ,brs) are a solution to the cluster-sending problem with optimal replica certificate usage. These protocols solve the cluster-sending problem using O(max(n C 1 , n C 2 )) messages, of size O( v ) each.
3. If n C > 3f C , C ∈ S, and S has Byzantine failures and replica sending, then BS-bcs, SPBS-(σ 1 ,bcs), and RPBS-(σ 2 ,bcs) are a solution to the cluster-sending problem. These protocols solve the cluster-sending problem using O(max(n C 1 , n C 2 )) messages, of size O( v + f C 1 ) each.
Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we formalized the cluster-sending problem, the problem of sending messages between clusters that can have faulty replicas. We proved fundamental lower bounds on the complexity of the cluster-sending problem. We also developed two powerful techniques, bijective sending and partitioned bijective sending, that can be used in the construction of practical cluster-sending protocols with optimal complexity. Our work provides a strong foundation for the further exploration of novel designs that address challenges encountered in resilient distributed systems.
These fundamental results open a number of key research avenues. First, the optimal protocols we propose apply to most practical situations, but in some extreme cases only the straightforward broadcasting-based protocols are applicable. It remains open whether we can improve on these broadcast-based protocols in all cases. Second, based on the assumptions made in this paper, we also foresee three fundamental opportunities for further study and development:
(1) The presence of public-key cryptography (replica signing or cluster signing). Without these tools, each replica can only reliable detect the sender of messages it receives from other non-faulty replicas and forwarding messages becomes much harder. Hence, we can only imagine a significant increase in the complexity of the cluster-sending problem.
(2) We operate in a fully dynamic failure model in which the set of faulty replicas is ever changing. The leader-less protocols we designed operate perfectly under this restriction. In many practical settings the set of faulty replicas is relatively stable, however. It remains open to what degree cluster-sending can be optimized to such an optimistic assumption about failures to reduce the expected complexity. As an example, we mention the usage of a dedicated reliable leader responsible for coordinating incoming and outgoing communication. Such a design, with all its challenges, has already seen limited usage in scalable BFT systems such as Steward [1] .
(3) Going beyond reliable networks. Assuming that the network is reliable enabled us to design one-way protocols without any message acknowledgement phases. Consequently, the protocols we present leverage network reliability to provide confirmation. Alternatively, our protocols can be extended to provide a best-case effort to detect and recover from network unreliability (as far as possible [7, 8, 18] ), which necessitates communication in both directions and will affect the lower bounds on the complexity of cluster-sending.
